Health awareness and the transition towards clean cooking fuels: evidence from Rajasthan by Zahno, Martina et al.
Health Awareness and the Transi-
tion Towards Clean Cooking 
Fuels: Evidence from Rajasthan 
Martina Zahno, Katharina Michaelowa, Purnamita Dasgupta, and 
Ishita Sachdeva
CIS Working Paper No. 102
August 2019
Center for Comparative and 
International Studies (CIS)
Health awareness and the transition towards
clean cooking fuels: Evidence from Rajasthan∗
Martina Zahno1, Katharina Michaelowa1, Purnamita Dasgupta2, and
Ishita Sachdeva3
1University of Zurich
2Institute of Economic Growth Delhi
3Delhi University
August 12, 2019
∗We are grateful for the support of the Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas,
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and all concerned field managers and LPG gas distributors in
Bikaner district in the implementation of this research. We also acknowledge the contribu-
tion to the data collection by Prof. Rajesh Sharma and a team of students at the SKRAU
Agricultural University Bikaner. We gratefully acknowledge a Scholar Exchange Grant
by the Indo-Swiss Joint Research Programme in the Social Sciences jointly funded by the
Indian Council for Social Science Research and the Swiss State Secretariat for Education,
Research and Innovation. Finally, we thank Lorenzo Casaburi, Paula Castro, Ipsita Das,
Jan-Walter De Neve, Sebastian Fehrler, Robert Huber, Michael Grimm, Lennart Kaplan,
Stefan Klonner, Olexiy Kyrychenko, Jörg Peters, Massimo Phillipini, Attonu Rabbani,
Alfonso Sánchez and Johannes Urpelainen for their insightful comments that have helped
us to improve the draft of this paper.
Abstract
Worldwide, about 2.9 billion people cook and heat using open fires and
simple stoves burning solid biomass like wood, dung or agricultural
residues. The inefficient combustion process causes high emissions of
aerosols and gaseous pollutants evoking serious adverse impacts on hu-
man health and the environment. To mitigate these health risks and
the associated detrimental climate active emissions, multiple initia-
tives have promoted the use of cleaner cooking technologies and fuels.
In this context, the Indian government currently promotes the use
of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). A large-scale program essentially
covering the upfront costs of the new technology has increased the
number of households with LPG stoves by more than 70 million since
2016. However, even after adopting LPG, a major fraction of the rural
population continues to rely on solid biomass as their primary cooking
fuel. One reason for the limited use of LPG could be that the health
effects of traditional cooking are not sufficiently known to the house-
holds. We examine this hypothesis through an experiment providing
randomized health information to 550 respondents with low LPG con-
sumption in rural Rajasthan. Our results indicate that health informa-
tion significantly increases the reported willingness to pay for LPG and
has a strong positive impact on consumption behavior. We show that
the causal mechanism indeed works via improved health knowledge,
which is significantly higher among households receiving the health in-
formation. We also find suggestive evidence that knowledge-building
regarding the health effects of cooking fuels should not target women
alone.
Keywords: Household air pollution, Health, Clean cooking fuels, Energy
access, Willingness to pay, Experiment, India
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1 Introduction
Across the world, about 2.9 billion people cook and heat using open fires and
simple stoves burning solid biomass like wood, dung or agricultural residues.
The consequences for human well-being are severe: household air pollution
from solid cooking fuels is responsible for approximately 4 million premature
deaths annually, caused by chronic lung disease, childhood pneumonia, car-
diovascular disease and cancer (WHO, 2014). In India, the health burden
from traditional cooking is particularly high. About 52% of fine ambient par-
ticulate matter concentration in the country is caused by residential energy
use (Conibear et al., 2018) and it is estimated that almost one million people
die prematurely from household air pollution every year (Smith and Sagar,
2014, p. 411).
Cleaner fuels such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), biogas or electricity,
can alleviate much of the health burden and of the emission of climate-active
pollutants from the inefficient combustion of solid biomass.
In this context, the Indian government is currently promoting large-scale
access to LPG. LPG has been available in India for a long time already at cen-
trally administered and subsidized rates. While LPG has become widespread
in urban areas, financial constraints have made it very difficult for many ru-
ral households to cover the upfront cost of adopting the technology (Jain
et al., 2015). In addition, LPG supply was limited in rural areas (Cheng and
Urpelainen, 2014).
The Indian government’s “Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana” (PMUY) pro-
gram was launched in 2016, with the intention to change this situation by
essentially covering the upfront costs for LPG for low-income households.1
Supported by improved supply and strong campaigning, since 2016, the num-
1See http://www.pmujjwalayojana.com/ for more information.
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ber of households registered as LPG users has already increased by over 70
million. However, many households who adopted LPG under the program
continue to rely on traditional biomass for a major part of their cooking.
Based on multi-year LPG sales data from Karnataka, Kar et al. (2019) show
that PMUY beneficiaries buy less than half the amount of LPG cylinder
refills as compared to general consumers in rural areas.
Low or fluctuating income levels and supply side constraints can no doubt
inhibit a switch to regular use of LPG in the Indian context (Heltberg, 2004).
However, in addition, households may simply not be aware of the important
advantages of LPG beyond the time saving effects and the convenience in-
volved. While LPG is advertised as a clean fuel, our interviews show that
women in rural Bikaner are unaware of the severe health risks they incur by
cooking with traditional biomass. Given such serious lack of information,
even without financial constraints or supply constraints people may not see
sufficient reason to switch to LPG as their primary cooking fuel.
Hence, providing appropriate health information could be key to induce
the transition to sustained use of clean cooking fuels. Related literature has
shown that convincing households of health benefits may not be an easy task
(Mobarak et al., 2012; Beltramo et al., 2015). But, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this has never been tested in the concrete context at hand. The closest
literature relates to LPG use in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh (Krishnapriya,
2017) and willingness to pay (WTP) for improved biomass stoves in rural
Bangladesh (Mobarak et al., 2012), where upfront costs were relatively high
and constituted an important barrier (see also Bensch et al., 2015). This
paper now examines the effect of brief health information on WTP and LPG
consumption in a context where the problem of high upfront cost was already
taken care of.
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Our evidence is based on a survey of 550 households in rural Bikaner
district in Rajasthan. Health information was randomly administered to one
part of the respondents, while the others received some general information
on LPG. We then measured the treatment effect on two variables: (i) the
necessary financial compensation to induce households to double their LPG
consumption at given prices (based on self-reported WTP in the context of
an adjusted Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (Becker et al., 1964)), and
(ii) the actual increase in consumption (measured by the households’ use of
a voucher for a new refill before a given deadline).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
extant literature regarding the effect of health information on household fuel
choice and cooking habits. In section 3 we develop the conceptual framework.
Section 4 presents the sampling strategy and the methodological approach
including the design of the experiment. Results are presented in Section 5,
and Section 6 concludes with policy insights from the study.
Overall, our experimental evidence suggests that health information is
highly effective and should be included in the campaigns to promote LPG.
We also provide some tentative evidence that it may be useful to target not
just women, but also men.
2 Health awareness and fuel choices
While there is an extensive literature on household fuel choice decisions in
low- and middle-income countries (for an overview see, e.g., van der Kroon
et al., 2013; Lewis and Pattanayak, 2012; Muller and Yan, 2018) there are
only a few studies examining the effect of health information on households’
decision making in this respect.
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2.1 Lacking knowledge about health hazards
The available evidence suggests that the knowledge about the health hazards
of traditional cooking is very poor. While a majority of households recognize
that there are some health hazards related to indoor aid pollution (Jain et al.,
2015; Mobarak et al., 2012), they largely underestimate the severity of these
risks (Mobarak et al., 2012). Furthermore, they consider information that
demonstrates the severity of these risks as highly salient (Beltramo et al.,
2015).
Hence—as also suggested by Jain et al. (2015)—the existing knowledge
gap may be an important hindrance for the greater uptake and use of clean
cooking fuels in India and elsewhere in the world. To bridge the knowledge
gap, the most natural intervention is to provide information. Given that the
knowledge gap is so profound, the effect of providing information may be
substantial.
2.2 Mixed findings on the role of health information
The few studies that have examined the effect of health information on house-
hold cooking fuel or technology use in a systematic way are primarily related
to the introduction of improved biomass cookstoves.2 In a descriptive survey-
based study, Jin et al. (2006) suggest that health education alone may not be
effective unless it is coupled with access to improved technology in the form
2Multiple initiatives have promoted the use of efficiency-enhancing improved cook-
stoves. These stoves have often not been well accepted by households though, which is
also true for India, where the adoption of improved biomass cookstoves has been limited
(Khandelwal et al., 2017). In addition, it remains disputed to what extent these stoves
have been able to reduce household air pollution sufficiently to generate the required health
benefits (for contrasting findings see e.g. Bensch and Peters, 2015; Smith et al., 2011 on
the one hand, and Sambandam et al., 2014; Hanna et al., 2016; Mortimer et al., 2017 on
the other hand). For these reasons, many experts now expect that promoting the direct
switch to electricity or clean fuels such as biogas or LPG will lead to a greater reduction
of household air pollution and hence to greater health benefits (Puzzolo et al., 2016).
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of culturally well-adjusted stoves. Similarly, using a differences-in-differences
design based on data for Tibet, Tun et al. (2005) find no significant effect
of health counselling on fuel change, despite the fact that significant changes
in the relevant knowledge are observed.3 In contrast, based on survey data
from urban Indian households, Gupta and Köhlin (2006) find that believing
that wood does not cause pollution significantly increases the quantity of
firewood used.
Evidence from experimental studies is not quite conclusive either. In a
randomized control trial with a clearly defined and strong health-information
treatment in Uganda, Beltramo et al. (2015) do not find consistent evidence
that information on the benefits of fuel-efficient cookstoves with regards to
health and time-savings improves WTP. The direct reaction to payment
modalities is much stronger than to the health information.
There are also a number of other randomized control trials related to the
adoption of improved cookstoves that use health information as a part of an
intervention. However, in these studies, information on the health benefits
of the improved stoves is provided for all treatment arms, and randomization
refers to other factors (Miller and Mobarak, 2015, 2013; Mobarak et al.,
2012). These studies can therefore not provide any information on the effect
of health messaging itself.
Mobarak et al. (2012) note a low willingness to pay for the improved stoves
despite the health information. This observation is in line with the role of
liquidity constraints highlighted by Beltramo et al. (2015) or with financial
constraints more generally that may prevent households from buying the
stoves. Indeed those studies providing clear evidence for successful health-
information interventions tend to consider situations in which such large
3See Barnes (2014) for a review of these and other related studies.
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upfront cost do not exist. They focus on behavioral change such as taking
the children out of the kitchen, or cooking outside or with open doors, rather
than in a closed room (see e.g. Barnes et al., 2011).
2.3 Insufficient evidence in the LPG context
In the specific context of LPG use, there is almost no evidence on the role
of health information. A notable exception is the field experiment by Krish-
napriya (2017) that covers the effect of health information with respect to
LPG uptake among other household choices of fuels and appliances in rural
communities of the Indian states of Kerala and Uttar Padesh. Households
were confronted with information of different levels of intensity. It turned
out that even the most intensive information through posters in the village,
leaflets and one-to-one explanations to representatives of each household did
not lead to a significant switch of households towards cleaner fuels, except
for the case of Kerala when the information was provided to women. In con-
trast, with regards to electric appliances (such as the purchase of LED bulbs)
the information treatment led to significant results. As purchasing a bulb
requires a much smaller investment than purchasing an LPG stove, the most
plausible explanation seems to be that LPG uptake is largely determined by
liquidity constraints or financial constraints more broadly. Since the conve-
nience of LPG use is more or less undisputed, alternative explanations are
less plausible here.
2.4 New situation as upfront costs are covered
If the above reasoning is correct, the introduction of the government’s PMUY
program in 2016 should have significantly changed the situation by lifting
the major constraint for the spread of the LPG technology. By offering
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LPG connections for free to poor rural households, the large upfront cost
is taken care of. ’LPG connection’ thereby refers to the establishment of a
formal account with a distributor as well as to the actual connection of the
LPG stove to the LPG cylinder with a hose and a regulator. At current
prices, this LPG connection comes at a fee of 1600 INR (about 25 USD),
and the additional cost for the first cylinder and the LPG stove are about
480 INR and 1020 INR respectively, i.e., another 1500 INR. Total upfront
cost hence amount to around 50 USD, which is difficult to bear for poor
rural households. In the context of the PMUY the government completely
takes over the cost of the LPG connection, and in addition, it provides the
opportunity to purchase the first cylinder and the LPG stove on the basis
of a loan by the distributors that is gradually repaid by a an increase in the
price of subsequent refills by approximately 170 INR.
As mentioned in the introduction, this opportunity to receive an LPG
connection, stove and the first cylinder initially free of charge has already
driven over 70 million households to adopt the new technology. If financial
and credit constraints are no longer binding, the relevant health information
should now be able to make a difference on actual use.
Of course, for a poor rural household, even the purchase of a refill for
480 INR (or more if some of the repayment of the loan for the stove and the
first cylinder is added to the bill of the refill) is a large investment. Hence,
in our context, financial constraints that prevented the initial uptake before
the PMUY may also prevent households from purchasing refills of the LPG
cylinder. The fact that domestic LPG consumption has been growing at a
much lower rate than could be expected from the huge increase in connections
may be a result of these remaining financial constraints (Jain et al., 2018; Kar
9
et al., 2019).4 Hence, for households under severe financial constraints, the
health information might still not make a difference. Whether or not health
messaging increases LPG consumption under the new financial conditions
yet remains to be tested.
2.5 Further drivers of LPG use
It is obvious that apart from our main variable of interest, i.e., health infor-
mation, a host of other factors can be expected to influence the use of LPG.
The energy transition literature, notably when it focuses on the use, rather
than just the adoption of clean cooking technologies, suggests a number of
factors that may be relevant in our context (see e.g. Masera et al., 2000;
Heltberg, 2004, Hanna and Oliva, 2015). Along with income and education,
the opportunity costs of fuel collection (e.g., Farsi et al. 2007; Gupta and
Köhlin 2006; Hanna and Oliva 2015), and factors related to the social and
cultural environment such as food taste preferences (e.g., Akpalu et al. 2011;
Srinivasan and Carattini 2019) have been identified as relevant for the use
of LPG. In the context of the Indian PMUY program, there has also been
a discussion whether or not LPG use may simply increase over time after
the initial acquisition of the stove (Jain et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2019;
Kar et al., 2019). This type of variables can be used to test the success
of randomization and/or as controls when we analyze the effect of health
information.
4At the same time the literature on fuel transition highlights that there is usually no
direct switch from one fuel to another but a period of combined use where several fuels
are stacked and some of them may only be used at the margin (van der Kroon et al., 2013;
Masera et al., 2000). The simple adoption of a new cooking technology does hence not
reveal much about the frequency of its use (Masera et al., 2000; Heltberg, 2004; Hanna
and Oliva, 2015). This is also confirmed by initial studies on rural LPG uptake and use
in India (Cheng and Urpelainen, 2014) and must be considered when examining drivers
of increased LPG consumption.
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The literature further suggests that there may be within-family differ-
ences in preferences for fuel choice, willingness to pay and reaction to health
information, since women and children often lack decision power over the fi-
nancial issues, but are at the same time most affected by indoor air pollution
(Mobarak et al., 2012; Miller and Mobarak, 2013; Krishnapriya, 2017).
3 Conceptual framework
We propose an illustrative utility-maximization model to motivate and struc-
ture our analysis. Let the household’s utility U be defined as a function of
the cooking gas LPG (g) and a composite good (x). x includes traditional
biomass for cooking such as firewood but also other consumption goods. To
ensure a certain degree of both complementarity and substitutability between
g and x we use a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U(g, x) = gθx1−θ (1)
with 0 < θ < 1.
The parameter θ captures the preference for cooking gas as compared to
the composite good, and we assume that it is non-zero since all households
we consider opted for an LPG connection through PMUY, and stated that
they would intend to purchase a refill at some point in the future. For an
income level of B and prices pg and px, the budget constraint is given as:
gpg + xpx ≤ B (2)
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Solving the optimization problem yields the Marshallian demand for LPG:
g∗(pg) =
B
pg
· θ (3)
This equation shows the household’s optimal LPG consumption as a neg-
ative function of the LPG price pg. We can invert this function to obtain an
expression of the price the household is willing to pay as a function of the
amount consumed, for given preferences and budget:
pg(g
∗) =
B
g∗
· θ. (4)
The first (rather trivial) observation to note is that since ∂pg
∂g
< 0, if a
household is asked to consume more than g∗, the price it must pay will have
to be reduced. What we are interested in here is how health information
affects (1) the discount a household demands when asked to substantially
increase LPG consumption and (2) the propensity of the household to ac-
tually increase consumption, when provided a pre-defined discount. Given
the setting underlying our study, where all households still have considerable
room for more frequent LPG use, a consumption increase of 100% is used to
indicate substantially higher consumption.
In the following, we first develop the theoretical expectations for (1),
i.e., the household’s willingness to pay for LPG conditional on increased use
(Section 3.1), and then derive the predictions for (2), the propensity to double
gas consumption (Section 3.2).
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3.1 WTP conditional on increased use
Let us consider that the preference for LPG θ is composed as follows: First, a
basic preference θ¯ due to the convenience and time savings and other general
benefits associated with cooking on the gas stove. Second, an additional
appreciation based on the health benefits, reflecting knowledge of the health
risks related to cooking with traditional biomass h, and the extent γ to which
this knowledge is salient for the decision maker. In particular, the salience
γ may vary based on the exposure to smoke from the traditional cookstove
(“chulha”), and thus be higher for women than for men. Consequently, we
define θ as:
θ = θ¯ + h · γ (5)
with 0 < h < 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
Now consider that we do not ask for the price households are willing to
pay for their currently optimal—but very limited—consumption, but for a
substantially increased consumption, namely a fixed g¯ = 2g∗. Including the
specification for θ and this fixed consumption requirement into into Eq.(4),
we obtain:
pg(g¯) =
B
g¯
· θ(h, γ) = B
g¯
· (θ¯ + h · γ) (6)
Taking the derivatives of pg(g¯) with respect to h and the cross-derivative
with respect to h and γ provides us with the relevant theoretical predictions
∂pg
∂h
> 0 and ∂
2pg
∂h∂γ
> 0 (for computational details, see Appendix A.1). We thus
expect to find two effects: (i) a positive effect of the health information on the
price the individual is willing to pay for LPG, and (ii) a positive interaction
effect with salience, i.e., in particular, a greater effect of the health messaging
on women than on men.
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Equivalently, we can express these hypotheses in terms of the compensa-
tion required by the individual to increase LPG consumption from g∗ to g¯.
The necessary compensation (C) corresponds to the market price of an LPG
refill (pm), which we can consider as given for our period of study, minus the
price the individual is willing to pay (pg), i.e., C = pm−pg. Hence, the effects
with respect to the necessary compensation (∂C
∂h
, and ∂2C
∂h∂γ
) correspond to the
above derivatives of pg(g¯) multiplied by (−1).
While our experiment allows us to test the effect of h, the evidence we
can provide on γ is suggestive only, since our experiment was not designed
to examine heterogeneous effects by gender. This will be discussed further
in Sections 4 and 5.
3.2 The propensity of doubling gas consumption
Let us now consider actual change in consumption. This change can be
observed through the use of a price-reducing voucher until a pre-defined,
household-specific deadline. More precisely, the outcome variable of interest
is the propensity of the household to use a voucher that ensures an increase
of LPG consumption from g∗ to g¯, for any level of a randomly determined
price reduction D and the resulting offer price pd = pm −D specified on the
voucher.
Let us denote voucher use by the indicator variable Y . Whether or not the
voucher is used depends on the difference in utility ∆U between a situation
in which the voucher is used U1 and a situation in which it is not used U0:
Y =
1 if ∆U > 00 if ∆U ≤ 0 (7)
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The difference in utilities itself reflects the (unobservable) propensity of
voucher use. Taking into account the conditions for voucher use, namely dou-
bling initial consumption and the discounted price pd, ∆U can be expressed
as:
∆U = U1 − U0 = g¯θ(B − g¯pd)1−θ − g∗θx∗1−θ. (8)
To predict how the propensity to use the voucher will react to health
messaging, and how this in turn is affected by the salience of this information
for the decision maker, we again compute the derivative with respect to h
and the cross-derivative with respect to h and γ. This yields the following
results: ∂∆U
∂h
> 0 and ∂2∆U
∂h∂γ
> 0 (see Appendix A.1).
The model thus predicts that, just as the WTP, the propensity to use
the voucher (and hence the propensity to double consumption) should be
positively affected by the health messaging, and this effect should again be
greater for decision makers for which the health information is more salient,
namely for women.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Sampling and survey implementation
We tested our hypotheses in the rural communities of Bikaner, a district in
the state of Rajasthan in Western India. The selection was purposive as it
fulfilled several criteria. Rajasthan was one of the first states to experience
the launch of PMUY in May 2016. This gave the program a clear one year
since its launch before our survey which started in October 2017.
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Available statistics on fuel use indicate that the district is quite represen-
tative for other parts of rural India. In 2011, 13% of the rural population in
Bikaner district used LPG as their main cooking fuel as compared to 11%
in rural India as a whole. Only regarding the solid fuels that are used as an
alternative, there are some differences. Given its dry climate and the related
lack of vegetation, dung cakes are more often used in Bikaner relative to
firewood (see Table 1). With respect to more general poverty-related indica-
tors that may be relevant to fuel choice, Bikaner varies around the country
average, with some factors above, and some factors below the all-India aver-
age. For instance, per capita income is almost equal to the national average,
electricity is more widely spread in Bikaner than in the rest of India, while
literacy rates are lower than average. The sex ratio is clearly below the In-
dian mean, which suggests that the status of women in the region is rather
low.5 There is, however, a general North-South divide with respect to this
indicator, and the rate we find for Bikaner district is close to the rates for the
large Northern Indian states such as Punjab (895) or Uttar Pradesh (912)
(Government of India, 2013-14).
The sample consists of 550 households who received an LPG connection
under the PMUY programme, but remained infrequent users. 55 villages were
sampled from the census lists (Government of India, 2013-14) with probabil-
ity proportional to population size. For each village, a simple random sample
of ten households was drawn from the village lists of PMUY beneficiaries.
On average, there where 133 PMUY beneficiaries living in each village in
the sample. Power calculations and the sampling procedure are described in
Appendix A.2.
5Low sex ratios indicate a high female abortion rate, a neglect regarding the female
children’s needs with respect to health and nutrition, and/or violence against women and
girls (including female infanticide). For a discussion, see, e.g., Drèze and Sen (2013).
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Table 1: Energy access and demographics Bikaner vs. India 2011
Bikaner India
Total Rural Total Rural
LPG main cooking fuel 59% 13% 29% 11%
Firewood main cooking fuel 21% 54% 49% 63%
Dung cake main cooking fuel 16% 31% 8% 11%
Electricity for lighting ( % ) 86% 62% 67% 55%
Average literacy 65% 61% 74% 69%
Sex ratio (women per 1000 men) 905 903 943 949
Net domestic product p.c. (INR) 52263 53331
Sources: Government of India (2013-14, 2012); Government of Rajasthan (2017); Direc-
torate of Census Operations Rajasthan (2014)
The sampling strategy with many villages and relatively few households
within each village was chosen to ensure that all interviews could be run
in parallel so that spillover effects would be minimized. Households that
were unavailable, impossible to trace or that turned out to be ineligible for
our sample were dropped and replaced from a back-up list of replacement
households at the time of the first visit to the village. No repeat visit was
made to a village.
Within each household, the preferred respondent was the main cook, who
is usually a female. However, men were accepted as respondents if the rele-
vant women were unavailable or unable to communicate to the enumerators
for cultural reasons. Eventually, there were about 10% male respondents
in the sample (see Appendix A.3, Table A3). At the outset, preliminary
screening questions were asked as follows:
1. Is the household indeed a PMUY beneficiary?
2. What is the frequency of use of cooking gas (LPG)?
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These initial questions allowed us to screen out households that did not
fit our criteria for infrequent use. We defined the corresponding threshold
at a yearly LPG consumption of less than six cylinders a year for a family
of five (excluding toddlers).6 Thus, all PMUY households consuming less
than 1.2 standard-size (14.2-kg) LPG cylinders per capita (for persons of age
six and above) per year are considered infrequent consumers. Households
covering all energy needs for cooking with LPG generally have a 50-100%
higher consumption in the sampled villages (Desai and Vanneman, 2015).
The responses to these questions were verified by checking the entries in
the respondents’ official gas passbooks that report the households’ average
LPG consumption per year and the date of the purchase of the cylinder
currently in use. This information allowed us to compute the expected time
until the next refill would become due based on past consumption patterns.
It should be noted that a number of initially selected villages and in-
dividual households, had to be replaced in the sample: First, for some of
the originally sampled villages, we were unable to obtain the list of PMUY
beneficiaries. Second, in some villages, a very large number of households
could not be traced as villagers were away for agricultural operations and
had moved into so-called ‘dhani’, i.e., shelters in the fields scattered around
the village and households. When this number became very high (crossed
30%), the whole village was replaced. Third, certain villages close to the
India-Pakistan border were replaced due to security concerns. Eventually,
the survey covered a total of 554 individuals from 55 villages.
Between September 2016 and March 2017 we carried out team building
activities, some initial training of enumerators, a focus group discussion, pi-
lots and key informant interviews, to understand the situation on the ground
6An average Indian family using LPG exclusively requires 10-12 cylinders per year (Kar
et al., 2019).
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and to refine our survey instruments. Subsequently, we established the co-
operation with LPG distributors, requested the PMUY lists and analyzed
secondary data sources from the Census and the National Sample Survey
(NSS) as relevant for our sampling procedure. In October 2017 we conducted
a final one-week intensive training workshop for the enumerators. The train-
ing included sessions on the rationale of the research design, exercises of the
interviews including the implementation of the WTP-elicitation mechanism
and the presentation of the different frames for the experiment (see below).
It also included a familiarization of the enumerators with the use of the sur-
vey application ‘Qualtrics’ that allowed them to directly register all answers
on electronic devices like tablets or smart phones. Based on this training,
the enumerators—a team of students from Bikaner Agricultural University—
carried out the data collection between October 2017 and February 2018. All
household interviews were conducted in Hindi or Rajasthani (Marwari).
The survey had several domains. The first section inquired extensively on
household demographic and socio-economic characteristics while the second
part had specific questions to understand cooking and fuel use patterns. Sub-
sequently, the survey application randomly assigned the health information
to 50% of the households, while the others received some general informa-
tion on LPG supply and its characteristics. Following this, the enumerators
assessed the required compensation for an increased use of LPG. Finally, the
survey included several questions to test whether the respondents understood
the health information provided.
The experimental set-up and the mechanism used to obtain the value of
the required compensation are described in detail below.
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4.2 Experimental set-up
The intervention consisted in verbal information on the effect of traditional
cooking on child development and diseases such as lung diseases, heart dis-
eases and eye diseases. The enumerators were given a pre-formulated one-
page text on these issues that they familiarized with and memorized in ad-
vance, so that they would keep their wording very close to the text without
directly reading it out. All enumerators also carried along a colored plasti-
cized picture card (size A4) with illustrations of the different diseases. The
duration of the presentation of health hazards lasted for three to five minutes.
Given the possibility that any frame—or simply the time spent on talking
about LPG—may affect the answers of the respondents (Haffert et al., 2017),
we constructed an alternative non-health related (and in this sense ’neutral’
or placebo) frame for the control group. This frame consists of information on
how cooking gas is extracted or produced from crude oil and then distributed
to the households. The information material again consists of a brief text
presented by the enumerator and a visualizing picture card to illustrate the
key messages. An English translation of the pre-formulated texts for both
treatment and control group as well as a copy of the corresponding picture
cards are presented in Appendix A.4. Randomization was automated through
the app that directly displayed only one of the two frames to the enumerator.
By design, the comparison of households who receive the health infor-
mation and households who receive the placebo treatment reflects the net
effect of the health information. If communicating about LPG over a certain
time indeed has an effect by itself, the gross effect of a health-information
(encompassing the effect of both, the health-relevant content, and time of the
LPG-relevant communication) should, in fact, be larger. As a consequence,
our estimates of the treatment effect can be considered as a lower bound of
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the effect of health information for a population that would otherwise receive
no LPG-related information at all.
After exposing the respondents to either of the two frames (health and
non-health), we first assessed the households’ stated WTP for LPG condi-
tional on increased use and then observed households’ actual consumption
behavior through the use (or not) of the voucher. Details on the measurement
of these outcome variables are provided in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
4.3 WTP conditional on increased use
There are several procedures used in experimental economics to measure
willingness to pay in a way that ensures that rational individuals will reveal
their genuine preferences. We base our WTP assessment for LPG on the
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)-mechanism (Becker et al., 1964), a widely
used option that mimics a Vickrey auction by replacing the other buyer
with a random number. Under a common version of the BDM-method, the
person states a bid (for a good to purchase). The bid is then compared to
a randomly determined offer price, that is, the price at which the good is
made available to the bidding person. If the person’s bid is higher than the
offer price, the item is sold at the offer price. If the bid is below the price,
no transaction happens and no payment is made. In this context, revealing
one’s true willingness to pay through the bid is a strictly dominant strategy.
In a study on willingness to pay for water filters in northern Ghana Berry
et al. (2019) demonstrated that the mechanism can be usefully applied even in
contexts of low numeracy among the respondents. To ensure that our respon-
dents really understand the process, we explained each step of the procedure
and followed it up by carrying out two rounds of the BDM-mechanism with
unrelated goods, first with a piece of soap, and then with a lighting bulb.
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If the respondents’ bid was higher than the offer price, they paid the offer
price and received the goods. Hence, by the time the respondents reached
the LPG assessment, they were quite familiar with the procedure and had
experienced that the implications of their decisions were real and binding.
With respect to LPG, the implementation of the BDM-mechanism re-
quired adjustments due to the specific context of the study. First, real trans-
actions with LPG cylinders are not possible, since LPG supply regulations in
India imply that households can only purchase the refill from official distribu-
tors of oil marketing companies, and that, too, only once they have used and
returned their empty cylinder. Hence, instead of concluding the transaction
by selling an LPG cylinder at the reduced offer price to successfully bidding
respondents, we handed out vouchers for the purchase of the next cylinder.
Second, we aim to elicit the WTP for LPG not as a good used only rarely
for special occasions, but on a more regular basis, i.e., under the condition
of increased use. This cannot be achieved simply by providing households
with the offer to buy an additional cylinder. As our sample only includes
households that plan to buy a refill at some point, over an infinite time
horizon, all of them should be willing to purchase one at the market price
pm.
To obtain the relevant information on the WTP for increased consump-
tion, the additional LPG use must be observable during a pre-specified pe-
riod, i.e., before a certain deadline. As mentioned earlier, we chose a deadline
relative to current use. More specifically, we fixed a specific deadline for each
household that would require this household to consume the remainder of the
LPG in the cylinder currently in use twice as quickly as under normal circum-
stances. The deadline was determined based on the information about the
family’s existing LPG consumption and the remaining time for using up the
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current cylinder using the information provided at the outset in the screen-
ing questions. If this estimate could not be meaningfully interpreted (for
instance, because the LPG connection was established only very recently),
the household was directly asked to make a prediction on when they would
need a refill and this prediction was halved to replace the estimate. The next
working day after the end of this period constituted the deadline determined
for the validity of the voucher. This expiry date was clearly communicated
to the respondent, and written on the voucher. We also monitored that it
was respected later by the distributors by checking the dated receipts for the
refills for which they were used.
We thus asked the respondents to make their bid for a new LPG cylinder
under the condition to use up their current cylinder until the deadline. This
bid was then compared to the randomly drawn discounted offer price pd. The
corresponding discount D over the market price pm of 480 INR was designed
to fall in the interval from 5 to 235 INR. Larger discounts were not expected
to be necessary. The offer price itself was then between 245-475 INR, and
drawn from number cards in front of the respondents (for details, also on the
choice of the price range, see Appendix A.5.1).
When the respondents stated a WTP which was at least as high as the
offer price, and hence the (offered) discount (D) greater than or equal to
the required compensation for the increased use of LPG, they received the
voucher, and they knew that they were expected to buy the next cylinder
before the expiry date indicated on the voucher.
Unlike in the prior examples with the soap and the light bulb, we could,
however, not enforce the final sale. This violates the conditions of the BDM-
mechanism because stating a bid that reveals the true required compensation
is then no more a strictly dominant strategy. Indeed, it does no harm to
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consumers to make a higher bid since anyway, if they bid high enough to get
the voucher, they do not need to actually make use of it. At the same time,
it does not make them any better off to make a higher bid than the one that
corresponds to their genuine willingness to pay. Hence revealing the truth
remains a weakly dominant strategy.
In any case, a rational respondent will never make a bid that is too low.
If at all, WTP will hence be overestimated by the procedure we chose. This
may add to the effect we could obtain due to the fact that people under both
the health and the alternative frame were confronted with some discussion
on LPG (see above). For both reasons, average WTP obtained in our survey
can be considered as an upper bound of the respondents true WTP.
Note that the effect of the health-information treatment on WTP should
not be affected by the enforcement problem. This is because there is no
reason to believe that it might affect the treatment and the control group
in different ways. As long as they are not affected in different ways, our
experiment should yield an unbiased estimate of the net effect of health
information on WTP.
4.4 Increase in LPG consumption
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we compare the actual voucher
use by the households in the treatment and in the control group. Since the
vouchers could be used only until the expiry date, the use of the voucher im-
plies that the household truly consumed the remaining LPG in their current
cylinder more quickly than usual, and that the incentive of the discount on
the next cylinder was sufficiently strong to trigger this behavioral change. In
addition, actual voucher use provides some insights into the sustainability of
the initial impression made by the health information.
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Two distinct factors should be considered in this context: First, while the
health information is only transmitted to the mostly female respondent who
also provides the statement on WTP, the choice to double LPG consumption
or not is the result of an intra-household decision-making process involving
several household members. The actual purchase is usually carried out by
men. These family members (i) do not directly obtain the health information
and (ii) may be less smoke-exposed than their spouses. Unless the informa-
tion is transferred within the family very convincingly, this should reduce
the effect of health messaging. Furthermore, the effect of health messaging
should depend on the power of the respondent within the intra-household
decision making process.
Second, over time, the impression of the health messaging may simply
fade away. In the most extreme case, the health information could be fully
forgotten, in which case the intervention would have a zero effect on voucher
use. In contrast, sharing health information and discussing it among family
members may also increase its influence on the purchasing decision due to
further reflection upon the topic, and respondents may develop a stronger
preference for LPG when they are continuously exposed to the toxic smoke
from the chulha after having learned what it implies for their health. Depend-
ing on which of these causal channels dominates health information may have
a stronger or weaker effect on actual consumption behavior. The effect may
also be stronger or weaker than what the respondent’s immediate reaction
on WTP may lead us to expect.
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5 Results
In a first step we test whether our randomization allows us to successfully
split the sample into two groups that are similar in all aspects that could
be relevant for WTP and voucher use. Table A1 in Appendix A.3 compares
the means of both groups for a number of variables including socio-economic
characteristics such as the respondent’s age, education, religion, household
size, the social category and proxies of income and wealth like assets and
land ownership. Further variables describe the household’s fuel choice and
cooking behaviour and capture preferences for and access to LPG: The av-
erage consumption of LPG, distance to the LPG sales point (zero in case of
home-delivery), perceived convenience of LPG, knowledge about LPG subsi-
dies and stated barriers to regular LPG consumption such as high refill costs
or safety concerns. Finally, there are variables directly related to the current
LPG use and the conditions under which respondents were bidding such as
the number of days until the voucher’s expiry date (voucher validity) and the
content of the current cylinder at the time of the survey. The comparison
across groups indicates that across all 25 variables, none of the differences
in means is statistically significant at the 10% level. This implies that po-
tentially confounding factors are well balanced across the two experimental
groups.
The same holds, if we limit the sample to those respondents who obtained
a voucher (see Table A2): Apart from a small difference in the share of Hindus
and Muslims, the two experimental groups only differ with regards to the
WTP for LPG, which is a desired effect of our intervention. A description of
all variables and summary statistics are provided in Appendix A.3.
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5.1 Impact on willingness to pay
Given the successful balancing of potentially confounding variables we can
now compare WTP for the treatment and the control group. Overall, the
health information leads to an average increase in WTP of about 10 INR
(from 352 to 362 INR, see Table 2 below).
The effect is not large, but the intervention was only very short and
carried out by enumerators that were strangers to the respondents. Under
conditions of more sustained health messaging by trusted health workers or
members of the local community, the effect might have been much stronger.
Furthermore, remember that the estimate reflects the net effect of health
messaging, and that the gross effect could be larger if the time of the com-
munication on LPG has a positive effect by itself.
To provide some more details on this result, Figure 1 displays the cumu-
lative distribution of the respondents’ stated WTP in both treatment groups.
Figure 1: WTP for LPG conditional on increased use, by experimental group
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The share of respondents accepting prices in the upper half of the price
range is consistently higher among subjects who were confronted with the
health information. Figure 1 also shows that the estimated median WTP
is at 350 INR per cylinder. Since these estimates must be considered as an
upper limit of the true WTP of our respondents (see Section 4.3), they are
well in line with the results of an earlier large-scale household survey in six
Indian states, which suggest that household who are interested in adopting
LPG would be ready to pay 300 INR per month (median) for covering all
cooking needs with LPG (Jain et al., 2018). While health information in-
creases WTP, substantial additional subsidies will still be required to induce
poor households to become more regular LPG consumers.
Apart from the direct effect of our intervention and the respondents’
price-elasticity of demand, their stated WTP may be influenced by some ad-
ditional factors. In particular, our previous discussion suggests that gender
differences, due to differences in smoke exposure and time spent with cook-
ing, should affect the impact of health information. It may also be relevant
to control for the content of the current cylinder and the time left until the
voucher needs to be used. Few households had a full cylinder at the time of
the survey, such that the requirement to speed-up consumption referred to
different absolute quantities. Households might agree to a lower compensa-
tion when their cylinder is already partly used. Similarly, the absolute time
period over which the behavioral change to double LPG consumption is re-
quired, varies between households. Due to differences in the usual speed of
consumption, this may be true even if the filling of the cylinders is initially
the same for two households. In principle, this could have implications for
WTP, too.7
7For instance, households might feel that a behavioral change over a small period of
time—maybe just a few days—is easier to achieve than a change over many weeks. In
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Whether these considerations do affect the respondents’ stated WTP, and
if so, in which direction, will be examined below. We will also add further
controls for potentially relevant household characteristics.
5.1.1 Multivariate regression analysis for WTP
Table 2 presents the results. As a baseline, Column 1 shows the effect of
the health treatment without any other variables, as already discussed in the
previous section. In Column 2 we examine heterogeneous treatment effects
by gender, and thus introduce a dummy variable for male respondents and
its interaction with the treatment variable.
As mentioned already, there are only few male respondents in our sam-
ple and they systematically differ from average men in the communities of
interest. In most cases, these men belong to very traditional families as they
did not allow their spouses to talk to the enumerators. This also suggests a
highly unequal balance of power in these households. Our estimations related
to gender effects must therefore be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless,
gender differentiation appears interesting enough for us to systematically
present whatever evidence we have. However, rather than to understand
our estimations as final results, they should be seen as suggestive evidence
calling for verification through future research. Whatever the particular se-
lection of men among our respondents, the results in Column 2 correspond
to our expectations.
this case WTP should be higher if the survey happens closer to the date at which the
next refill would have been required anyway. However, one could also imagine that having
more time enables the household to plan the increased consumption in a better way, i.e.,
by using LPG rather than the chulha when many guests are in the house, which may not
happen that frequently. Moreover, time preference would imply that a compensation to
be received in the far away future would be valued less than a payment one could receive
within a few days.
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Table 2: Treatment effect on WTP, including controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health information 10.237∗ 13.777∗∗ 12.175∗∗ 13.166∗∗
(0.065) (0.013) (0.036) (0.046)
Male 31.863∗∗ 54.111∗∗∗ 42.714∗∗
(0.014) (0.001) (0.014)
Health information X Male -41.385∗ -62.277∗∗ -53.083∗
(0.072) (0.020) (0.068)
Voucher validity -0.283 -0.298
(0.178) (0.199)
Content 4.245 5.845
(0.766) (0.698)
Asset index 0.342
(0.906)
Land 15.647∗∗
(0.029)
LPG distance -0.170
(0.673)
Fin. restriction -14.355
(0.172)
Education 3.402
(0.289)
Age -0.341
(0.316)
Household size -0.853
(0.574)
Months since LPG adoption -0.191
(0.645)
Constant 351.678∗∗∗ 348.846∗∗∗ 352.230∗∗∗ 366.083∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
adj. R2 0.003 0.008 0.017 0.019
N 539 539 468 455
p-values based on standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Note that due to the inclusion of the interaction term, the coefficient es-
timate for health information now refers to female respondents alone. With
a point estimate of about 14 INR it is higher than the average for all re-
spondents (male and female) in Column 1. Correspondingly, the negative
coefficient of the interaction term suggests that men react to health messag-
ing much less than females. For men alone, the effect of health messaging
is insignificant in our sample (not shown). The main effect of the dummy
for male respondents further indicates that within our sample, men gener-
ally state a much higher WTP than women. This seems to be a common
result for WTP assessments in households in which women are not used to
commit to major payments, and does not specifically relate to LPG (see also
Beltramo et al. (2015)). In our sample, only 3% of the women report taking
decisions on the purchase of durable goods on their own.
Column 3 then adds controls for the remaining content of the cylinder at
the time of the survey, and the period of validity of the voucher. None of the
two are significant. This suggests that neither of the two play a major role in
determining the compensation for increased consumption requested by the
household. Rather, households seem to just consider the required change
in behavior in terms of the relative increase in consumption, no matter the
period over which this change is requested, and no matter how much the
absolute quantity of LPG consumption this implies.
Column 4 further adds a number of other control variables that might
be relevant for the willingness to pay. The only significant variable is land,
reflecting that wealthier households owning some land tend to have a higher
WTP. Note that the effects of the control variables (or the lack thereof)
should not be over-interpreted as some of them are highly correlated. They
are included mainly to show the robustness of the main results. The es-
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timated treatment effect remains positive and significant throughout (with
little change in size across Columns 2-4 in which it refers to females). The
sign and significance of gender differences also remain robust, albeit with
considerable variation in the effect size, which is due to the lack of precision
given the small number of men in our sample.
5.2 Impact on voucher use
So far, the results thus confirm our hypotheses. But is the voucher that allows
the household to buy the next LPG cylinder at or below the price of reported
WTP actually used? Does it indeed lead to the requested behavioral change
of doubled consumption until the given deadline?
Remember that there are several reasons why this may not necessarily
be the case: First, using the BDM-mechanism with a voucher rather than a
direct purchase, WTP may be overstated. Second, respondents on WTP were
mainly women who do not seem to have much influence on actual purchases.
Third, the effect of talking about LPG and its health benefits may fade over
time. And fourth, independently of the household’s preferences, remaining
supply constraints in Bikaner’s rural villages may in some cases prevent a
household from making the purchase before the deadline, even if it wishes to
do so. In the following, we will thus examine the effect of health information
on voucher use directly.
Overall, in 303 out of 539 conducted BDM-procedures, the respondent’s
bid (i.e., stated WTP) was sufficiently high to receive a voucher. The voucher
values, i.e. the discounts offered on the purchase of the next LPG cylinder,
range from 5 to 235 INR, about 70 % of them lie above 150 INR. For 296
vouchers handed out to households we could trace whether the beneficiary
had used the voucher to cover a part of the household’s next LPG purchase.
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It turns out that only 35% of these 296 households actually used the
voucher. Unfortunately, we are unable to disentangle the different possible
reasons discussed above, and any combination of these could be responsible
for this result. What we can examine, however, is the extent to which our
intervention, namely the health messaging, affected the actual use of the
voucher.
5.2.1 Effect of health info on voucher use among voucher owners
As in our analysis of WTP we proceed with regressions starting with a simple
bivariate estimation of the treatment effect and progressively adding more
variables. Table 3 presents the results using linear probability models (rather
than probit or logit models) for ease of interpretation.8
Based on the 296 available observations, we find a strong and significant
effect of health information on voucher use: The probability that a household
uses its voucher is 11 percentage points higher for households that received
the health information (41 vs. 30%, see Column 1). This corresponds to
an increase by more than one third. The effect is even more remarkable
given the time passed after the treatment, and the required intra-household
transfer of the information. In addition, since spill-overs between treatment
and control group cannot be avoided during the time until voucher use, this
result represents a lower limit of the actual effect. Finally, as before, we
should remember that we only estimate the net effect of health messaging,
not including the possible impact of LPG-related communication time, which
was the same for both treatment groups.
8Running the same estimations using probit models leads to very similar results that
are even more precise (results available on request).
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Table 3: Treatment effect on voucher use, including controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health information 0.111∗∗ 0.075 0.108∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.046) (0.200) (0.084) (0.029)
Male -0.025 0.000 0.082
(0.824) (1.000) (0.571)
Health information X Male 0.466∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.314
(0.006) (0.047) (0.144)
Voucher validity 0.000 0.000
(0.875) (0.985)
Content -0.168 -0.192
(0.316) (0.264)
Asset index 0.016
(0.459)
Land 0.046
(0.474)
LPG distance 0.005
(0.130)
Fin. restriction 0.101
(0.123)
Education 0.001
(0.982)
Age -0.004
(0.303)
Household size -0.025∗
(0.065)
Months since LPG adoption 0.008
(0.101)
WTP for LPG -0.001∗∗
(0.027)
Constant 0.300∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
adj. R2 0.010 0.033 0.029 0.065
N 296 296 254 247
Linear probability models, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
p-values based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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Columns 2-4 add a differentiation by the gender of the respondent and
further controls. In contrast to theoretical expectations, it seems that the
positive and significant overall effect is now primarily driven by the few male
respondents in our sample. The interaction term is strong and significant
in two out of three regressions. Furthermore, for men alone, the treatment
effect is always positive and significant (not shown), while this is not the
case for female respondents. This is surprising since the male respondents in
our sample initially did not seem to react to the treatment—as measured by
their statement on WTP.
This suggest some interesting dynamics after the visit by our enumera-
tors. Due to their lack of power within the household, women seem to have
more difficulties to transform their initially voiced preferences into the house-
hold’s final purchasing decision. Hence, even if their greater smoke exposure
leads them to react more strongly to health information in the first place,
they may not always be in a position to actually push for a greater use of
LPG. Men, once convinced, do not have this problem. At the same time, they
seem to require more time to react to the health information received. They
might first cross-check this information and/or discuss the issue within the
family and with friends. This suggests that at given power relations within
rural Indian households, it is important to convince men about the health
benefits of LPG, and not just women. Unfortunately, we did not have the
opportunity to check this explanation through additional qualitative inves-
tigations. Furthermore, it is is possible that some of the effect we observe is
driven by the special selection of men in our sample.
Regarding the control variables, there is no surprise. As before, most of
them are insignificant, this time including the indicators we use for wealth
and income. This is consistent with our model since the budget is as relevant
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for U0 without the voucher as for U1 with the voucher and hence cancels
out for ∆U (see Appendix A.1.2). Only household size has a negative and
significant coefficient, and of course WTP, as the latter is negatively related
to the discount amount by design. Households obtain the vouchers only if
their stated WTP is higher than the randomly drawn, discounted offer price.
Hence, the higher this price (i.e., the lower the discount D), the higher must
be their WTP for them to be at all included in the sample.
The latter also leads to a more general risk of selection bias, even when
we control for WTP. The average WTP in the sub-sample of voucher own-
ers is significantly higher than the WTP of those respondents who did not
receive a voucher (390 vs. 314 INR). As a result, the sub-sample may not be
representative of our initially drawn sample of typical PMUY users.
This problem also affects our estimate of the treatment effect. As the
health information affects WTP, it also affects the selection into the sub-
sample of voucher owners. Studying the treatment effect within this sub-
sample will thus not provide us with a valid estimate for the full impact of
our intervention.
5.2.2 Joint effect of health information on voucher use
In order to avoid the selection problem discussed above, we additionally
estimate the joint effect of health information on voucher use. That is, we
now use the total sample of respondents, no matter whether they obtained a
voucher or not, and set the outcome variable “voucher use” to zero for those
respondents who did not receive a voucher in the first place (as their WTP
was below the randomly drawn offer price). The share of voucher users in
the total sample of households in our sample is now 20% (among voucher
owners only, it was 35%). We use a fixed effect for each offer price, as the
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chance to obtain a voucher with a given WTP increases with decreasing offer
prices. The fixed effects will thus provide a substantial part of explanation
for the zero-values in the outcome variable.
Table 4 shows the results from a linear probability model estimation of
the joint effect of health information on the probability to make use of a
discount voucher.9 Without offer-price fixed effects, the probability of a
household to use a voucher (and thus to demonstrate doubled consumption)
increases from 17 to 23% if a member of this household is confronted with
health information. This corresponds to an increase by 35 percent. While
the absolute value of the increase is thus smaller than in the sub-sample of
voucher owners (6 as compared to 11 percentage points), in relative terms,
the increase is as important as before. When we include offer-price fixed
effects, the estimator becomes more precise.
In terms of heterogeneous treatment effects the results tend in the same
direction as before, but the interaction term is smaller and remains insignif-
icant. Yet, again, the effect for male respondents is very strong (24% in
Column 3 and 19% in Column 4) and consistently significant (not shown),
as opposed to the effect for female respondents that is significant only in
Column 4.
This confirms the previous evidence. If we believe that the particular
selection of men within our respondents is in any way meaningful for the rest
of the population, this again suggests that men, too, are responsive to health
information, and that it is important to convince them at least as much as
their spouses.
9Probit model estimations provided on request.
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Table 4: Joint effect of health information on voucher use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health information 0.058∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.054 0.085∗∗
(0.094) (0.047) (0.117) (0.029)
Male 0.052 0.123
(0.543) (0.279)
Health information X Male 0.189 0.098
(0.173) (0.561)
Content -0.115
(0.203)
Voucher validity -0.000
(0.822)
Asset index 0.011
(0.375)
Land 0.024
(0.539)
LPG distance 0.004∗
(0.087)
Fin. restriction 0.034
(0.452)
Education 0.006
(0.728)
Age -0.003
(0.208)
Household size -0.016∗∗
(0.017)
Months since LPG adoption 0.003
(0.318)
Offer price fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.169∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
adj. R2 0.003 0.081 0.091 0.100
N 532 531 531 449
Linear probability models, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
p-values based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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While we have so far used fixed effects to account for differences in the
randomly drawn offer price, we can also include the offer price pd directly as
an explanatory variable. While this constrains its impact to a linear effect,
it allows us to more easily interpret the corresponding coefficient estimates.
Appendix A.5.2 shows the results. In line with the predictions of our model
(see Appendix A.1.2) we find that price reductions have a positive effect on
the household’s purchasing decision (see Table A4). A discount of 50 INR
increases the probability of voucher use by about 10 percentage points, which
is similar to the estimated impact of our brief health information (11 per-
centage points in the corresponding model with all controls; see Table A4,
Column 4). The latter remains stable across the range of discount values (see
Figure A5). This implies that health information and price reductions can
be combined to yield the sum of the individual effects. They neither interfere
with each other, nor are there any complementarities.
5.3 Testing the information channel
While we argue that the success of the intervention is based on the respon-
dents’ greater health awareness, this has not been directly tested so far. In
this last part we will thus assess the effect of the health-messaging on health-
related knowledge. To that aim we compare post-intervention responses to
several questions regarding the health hazards related to traditional cooking
from the treatment group with those of the control group.
First, we examine the response to the question whether traditional cook-
ing affects health slightly, severely, or not at all. Our dependent variable is a
binary indicator of the believe that there are serious health hazards implied.
The relationship between the health information and the reported awareness
of serious health hazards is highly significant and strong. Without any fur-
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ther information, respondents knew very little about health hazards related
to smoke from the chulha, leaving much scope for improvement: under the
alternative frame, only 13% believed that there are serious health hazards
related to cooking with traditional biomass. This was also confirmed in com-
plementary qualitative interviews with other households. When women were
asked about health effects, they primarily thought of these as temporary
irritations such as cough or watering eyes, and stated that these were not
problems of any major consequence, but rather something to get used to
over time. In contrast, among respondents that received the health informa-
tion, 48% report to be aware of serious adverse health effects, i.e., reported
awareness is four times as high as before.
Table 5, Column 1 presents these results distinguishing by gender. Among
female respondents, 12% of the untreated report that they are aware of severe
health issues as compared to 46% (12+34%) of the treated.
Table 5: Treatment effect on health-awareness
(1) (2) (3)
Severe effects IAP diseases All diseases
Health information 0.343∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.132 -0.176∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.000) (0.000)
Health information X Male 0.157 0.029 0.023
(0.181) (0.590) (0.570)
Constant 0.118∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
adj. R2 0.160 0.096 0.084
N 503 539 539
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
p-values based on standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses.
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The men in our sample respond more frequently that they are aware of
severe health hazards, but the difference to women is not significant. The
interaction effect is not significant either suggesting that the effect of health
messaging on health knowledge does not differ by gender. Results are robust
to the addition of additional control variables (not shown).
Of course the treatment effect of the health message may be partly due to
social-desirability bias: after the information treatment, respondents know
that a positive answer is expected and might hence pretend awareness of
severe health hazards even without fully understanding or being really con-
vinced.
We thus consider a second dependent variable, which requires concrete
knowledge about health hazards incurred when using traditional solid fuels
for cooking. This variable reflects the share of diseases related to indoor
air pollution (IAP) correctly identified within a set of ten diseases out of
which only six are indeed related to IAP. Column 2 presents the results.
They confirm those of the previous estimation. Our brief health informa-
tion increases the share of correctly identified smoke-related diseases by 15
percentage points for females—and similarly for males since the interaction
term is very small and statistically insignificant. Independently of the health
messaging, in our sample, female respondents generally recognize diseases
related to traditional cooking substantially better than male respondents.
As a third dependent variable, we examine the share of correctly identi-
fied diseases among all ten diseases. A value of one of this variable implies
that not only the IAP-related, but also the IAP-unrelated diseases are cor-
rectly identified. This ensures that high values on the dependent variables
cannot be obtained simply by responding in a way that relates all kinds of
diseases to cooking habits. Hence the values of this variable cannot be driven
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by social-desirability bias. When using this variable, the treatment effect is
smaller (only about 7 percentage points), but remains highly significant (see
Column 3). Again the treatment effect does not differ between male and fe-
male respondents, i.e., there is no gender difference regarding the capacity to
absorb the health information we provide. But again, overall, women recog-
nize the relevant diseases substantially better than men. Unless this is driven
by the particular selection of men in our sample, this gives some plausibility
to our assumption that women who are exposed to smoke on a daily basis
my find the knowledge about smoke-related diseases more important than
men. In any case, this could explain why they tend to be somewhat better
informed already prior to our intervention.
In sum, the empirical evidence thus confirms that the intervention in-
creases the respondents’ knowledge about the health hazards related to tra-
ditional cooking. Despite some differences in initial knowledge, this is true
for both women and men, with no observable difference in the treatment
effect, at least within our sample. This implies that gender differences in the
impact of the treatment on WTP and voucher use cannot be explained by
differences in the capacity to absorb the information we provide. This is in
line with our theoretical argument, which suggests that gender differences
are driven by differences in the salience of the information, rather than by
the information itself. Of course, as we have seen, such differences may be
overridden by practical constraints related to the limited power of females in
household decision making over expensive items.
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6 Conclusion
Traditional cooking habits based on the use of solid fuels such as cow dung
and firewood generate severe health hazards. In India, the health burden
from traditional cooking is particularly high. This paper examined to what
extent health information for poor rural households can mitigate the prob-
lem. Based on a survey in rural Bikaner district (Rajasthan), we analyzed
the effect of a health-information intervention on willingness to pay and the
propensity to consume more LPG, a clean fuel, which all of our sample house-
holds already have access to in principle through the Indian government’s
PMUY program.
Our results show that health information increases the reported willing-
ness to pay for LPG, and substantially increases actual consumption among
households who currently use LPG only on a very infrequent basis. We mea-
sure this based on a voucher, which can only be used if LPG consumption is
doubled until a certain deadline. Households exposed to health messaging,
use the voucher about 30% more often than households exposed to a placebo
treatment. We further show that the impact of our very brief, but concrete
health messaging is as strong as a decrease in the price of a new LPG cylinder
by about 50 INR.
Obviously, health messaging does not need to be considered as an alterna-
tive to price reductions. Our results confirm prior studies indicating that the
willingness to pay for regular LPG use by a typical poor rural household is
considerably below the current regulated market price of 480 INR per cylin-
der. It may thus be useful to combine health messaging and price reductions.
We find that they neither interfere with, nor reinforce each other, so that any
combination of both measures should simply yield the sum of the individual
effects.
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Our results also confirm that the health messaging indeed increases the
respondents’ knowledge about smoke related diseases, which is an important
precondition for the causal effect we claim. It should be noted that without
any health information, the relevant knowledge is extremely low. Among the
untreated, only 13% of all respondents believe that cooking with traditional
biomass entails any serious health risks. This percentage increases to 48% in
the treatment group. The low initial knowledge may be one reason why we
find such substantial effects on LPG use.
Beyond the general effects, our study suggests some heterogeneous treat-
ment effects for male and female respondents. In line with theoretical expec-
tations about the gender-specific salience of cooking related health hazards,
female respondents react much more strongly to health information than the
male respondents in our sample, when it comes to their stated willingness to
pay. However, the estimated treatment effect on voucher use is greater for
male than for female respondents. This suggests that until the final purchase
of the next LPG cylinder, some interesting intra-household dynamics may
be at play. Women often lack decision-making power on major purchases,
and they may not always be able to convey the relevant health information
obtained during the treatment to their husbands. This suggests that in order
to obtain an actual increase in LPG consumption, health messaging should
focus on men as much as on women.
We highlight these gender-specific outcomes here, because we believe that
they may be important. However, it should be noted that our study was not
initially designed to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. In particular,
the number of men in our sample is small, and they are certainly not repre-
sentative for the male population in rural India. Further research is required
to test the validity of these results.
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A Appendix
A.1 The model in detail
In this paper, we proposed an illustrative model based on the Cobb-Douglas
utility function:
U(g, x) = gθx1−θ (1)
where g is the cooking gas LPG, x is a composite good that includes tradi-
tional biomass and other goods, and θ ∈ [0, 1] is an indicator for the prefer-
ence for LPG as compared to the composite good.
For an income B and prices pg and px, the budget constraint is:
gpg + xpx ≤ B (2)
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields the Marshallian demand function for
LPG:
g∗(pg) =
B
pg
· θ (3)
Inverting this function we obtain the price a household is willing to pay
for this quantity of LPG:
pg(g
∗) =
B
g∗
· θ. (4)
A.1.1 Predictions related to WTP
Imagine we request the household to increase its consumption from g∗ to
g¯ = 2g∗ as we are interested in the WTP for regular rather than very spo-
radic users. Assume that such a doubling of LPG consumption is feasible
within the budget constraint (Assumption 1, see Section A.1.3). To make
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this situation again optimal for the household, the new price must be 50%
lower than the initial price:
pg(g¯) =
B
g¯
· θ = 1
2
· pg(g∗). (5)
While this exact relationship is directly related to the restrictive assump-
tion underlying the Cobb-Douglas utility function that the price-elasticity of
demand is equal to 1, even otherwise, we would clearly expect a reduction in
WTP with an increase in the requested amount to be consumed.
More interesting in the context of our study, however, is the question
to what extent health information can compensate some of this reduction in
WTP. What is the change in WTP if we increase the decision maker’s knowl-
edge about the adverse health effects of cooking with traditional biomass?
Let us consider the preference for LPG θ as a linear function of health
knowledge h ∈ [0, 1]:
θ = θ¯ + h · γ (6)
where θ¯ ∈ [0, 1] is basic preference (e.g., due to the convenience and time
savings associated with LPG) and γ ∈ [0, 1] is a factor reflecting the salience
of health information, notably due to gender.
We can then rewrite pg(g¯) as:
pg(g¯) =
B
g¯
· (θ¯ + h · γ) (7)
The expected effect of health messaging on WTP is then given by:
∂pg
∂h
=
B
g¯
· γ > 0 (8)
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We are further interested to see if the impact of health messaging is
affected by differences related to gender reflected by differences in the salience
of the health information. To see this we need to take the cross-derivative
with respect to h and γ. To do so, note that factors such as gender already
influence the initial value of g∗ and thus also g¯. More formally, we can write:
g¯ = 2g∗(pm, θ¯) = 2
B
pm
· (θ¯ + h¯ · γ) (9)
where pm is the original market price and θ¯ = θ¯ + h¯ · γ the initial preference
for LPG. In other words, g¯ is fixed as the double of the optimal consumption
at the general market price and the initial preference for LPG θ¯ that is based
on the initial health knowledge and salience. We keep h fixed at this initial
level h¯ as its change due to the treatment does not influence g∗. In contrast,
a greater salience of such health knowledge γ already influences the initial
g∗. Hence, g¯ needs to be considered as a function of γ but not of h when
we take the derivatives. We assume that the treatment itself does not affect
γ (Assumption 2, see Section A.1.3), which is obvious if we think of it as
reflecting the gender of the decision maker.
Inserting (9) in (8) and taking the derivative with respect to γ, we obtain:
∂2pg
∂h∂γ
=
θ¯pm
2(θ¯ + h¯γ)2
> 0 (10)
A.1.2 Predictions related to the propensity of voucher use
The propensity to use the voucher can be expressed as the difference in utility
∆U between a situation in which the voucher is used U1 and a situation in
which it is not used U0. Taking into account the conditions for voucher use,
namely doubling initial consumption and the discounted offer price pd we can
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specify U1 as
U1 = g¯
θx1−θ = g¯θ(B − g¯pd)1−θ (11)
In contrast, the utility when the voucher is not used U0 simply corresponds
to Eq.(1) evaluated at the optimal level of consumption given the market
price pm, without any discount but with the possibility to freely adjust all
quantities to changes in θ:
U0 = g
∗θx∗1−θ (12)
∆U can thus be rewritten as
∆U = U1 − U0 = g¯θ(B − g¯pd)1−θ − g∗θx∗1−θ. (13)
To facilitate the computation of the derivatives we simplify Eq. (13)
through a monotonous transformation using logs. This transformation will
leave the sign of the derivatives unchanged.
∆u = lnU1 − lnU0
= (1− θ) ln B − 2g
∗(pm, θ¯)pd
B − g∗(pm, θ)pm + θ ln
2g∗(pm, θ¯)
g∗(pm, θ)
= (1− θ) ln (1− 2θ¯ pd
pm
)− (1− θ) ln (1− θ) + θ ln (2θ¯)− θ ln θ
(14)
Replacing θ by (6) and taking the derivative with respect to h yields:
∂∆u
∂h
= −γ ln
(
1− 2θ¯ pd
pm
2θ¯
)
+ γ ln
(
1− θ
θ
)
> 0 (15)
Note that this computation is again based on Assumption 1 (a doubling
of consumption is feasible within the budget constraint), or else, we would
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take the log of a negative quantity in the first term. A further relevant
assumption is that the requirement to double LPG consumption in order to
use the voucher is a binding constraint (Assumption 3, see Section A.1.3).
For more extreme preferences for LPG, the model would suggest that the
household would forego the voucher in order to be able to consume more
LPG. This situation is irrelevant in practice, as the voucher can also be
used any time before the deadline, and hence there is no constraint on the
maximum use of LPG. For reasons of simplification, the model has not been
designed to cover these obvious cases where the health treatment is extremely
effective. Finally, remember that 0 < pd
pm
≤ 1 since pd is the discounted price
while pm is the market price. Considering all these arguments, we obtain the
sign of the derivative.
We now examine how the impact of h on ∆u varies for different levels
of the salience of health information. We use (15) evaluated at the initial
preferences for LPG θ = θ¯. Considering that θ¯ = θ¯ + h¯ · γ we can take the
derivative of ∂∆u
∂h
with respect to γ to obtain the cross-derivative:
∂2∆u
∂h∂γ
= ln
(
2(1− θ¯)
1− 2θ¯ pd
pm
)
+ γ
h · (2 pd
pm
− 1)
(1− 2θ¯ pd
pm
)(1− θ¯) > 0 (16)
This inequality holds under exactly the same conditions as the inequality
in (15).
Before concluding this analysis, let us further examine the reaction of
∆u to a change in the discounted offer price pd. Since this price can be
obtained only when the household effectively uses the voucher, a lower pd
makes voucher use more attractive:
∂∆u
∂pd
= − (1− θ)2θ
(1− 2θ)pm < 0 (17)
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This inequality only requires Assumption 1 (see Section A.1.3). The
negative relationship between WTP and the required consumption is thus
also reflected in the lower propensity of voucher use (implying the doubling
of consumption) for higher pd.
Finally, note that—as opposed to WTP—the propensity of voucher use
is unrelated to the budget B, since it enters in the same way in both U1 and
U0 and hence cancels out:
∂∆u
∂B
= 0 (18)
A.1.3 Assumptions
This section provides an overview of the three main assumptions referred to
above:
1. Doubling LPG consumption (as imposed in the experiment) is theoret-
ically possible, i.e., the consumption of other goods does not fall below
0, for all possible prices pd ∈ [0.5pm, pm] and θ. Formally,
B − 2g∗(pm, θ) · pd > 0,∀pd,∀θ
Using Eq.(3) this further implies: 1− 2θ > 0, ∀θ.
2. The treatment d ∈ [0, 1] does not alter γ directly, i.e., health messaging
only affects health knowledge h, but not the salience of this knowledge:
∂γ
∂d
= 0
This is certainly true for the main variable we think of in this context,
namely gender, but also smoke exposure more broadly, which cannot
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change immediately, i.e., prior to the household’s reactions with respect
to consumption or stated WTP that we are assessing here.
3. The preference increase for LPG as a result of the intervention is not
so strong that the household would want to increase its LPG use by
more than 100%. This implies that the requirement we impose on the
household to at least double its LPG consumption can be treated in the
model as a requirement to double consumption:
g¯ = max{2g∗(pm, θ¯), g∗(pd, θ)} = 2g∗(pm, θ¯)⇒ 2θ¯ > θ
The alternative case is of course possible, but including this option into
the model would make the model more complex, while not changing
anything substantially. This is because households willing to consume
more than 2g∗(pm, θ¯) will have an even higher propensity to use the
vouchers.
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A.2 Power calculation and sampling protocol
We determined our sample size based on the aim to detect an additional
WTP for LPG associated with the intervention of 12 INR or larger.
12 INR corresponded to 2.5% of the regulated market rate for a standard
size LPG cylinder when the fieldstudy started (= 480 INR). Assuming that
the pooled standard deviation of WTP would be 60 INR (based on a pilot
among 21 households), the price difference of 12 INR corresponded to a
between-groups effect size of d=.2, which is a small effect according to the
convention of Cohen (1988). To obtain statistical power at the recommended
0.8 level with alpha set at 0.05 for a two-tailed test, a sample of 393 would be
required. However, if the variance is higher, the required sample size increases
substantially. We hence aimed at 500 usable observations for the experiment.
Adding 10% to account for different kinds of data problems which may arise
resulted in 550 planned interviews. The protocol below describes how these
550 households were sampled.
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Figure A1: Sampling protocol
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A.3 Summary statistics and balance tests
Table A1: Means and tests of treatment-control covariate balance
Total Control Treatment Difference
mean mean mean b t
Male 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.01 (0.62)
Age 28.55 28.29 28.81 -0.52 (-0.73)
Education 1.50 1.57 1.43 0.14 (1.43)
Household size 6.00 5.85 6.15 -0.30 (-1.53)
Hindu 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.02 (1.24)
Muslim 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01 (-1.02)
BPL 0.60 0.57 0.63 -0.06 (-1.27)
Expenditures 6752.59 6740.38 6764.75 -24.37 (-0.07)
Land 0.66 0.63 0.68 -0.05 (-1.15)
Asset index -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 (-0.38)
Refills 0.91 0.90 0.92 -0.02 (-0.88)
LPG consumption 0.24 0.23 0.25 -0.01 (-0.99)
Wood quantity 45.75 47.63 43.85 3.78 (1.17)
Dung quantity 52.47 51.78 53.17 -1.39 (-0.38)
Random price 339.94 336.41 343.48 -7.06 (-1.29)
Content 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.01 (0.53)
Voucher validity 21.05 21.34 20.75 0.59 (0.37)
Subsidy 0.15 0.13 0.17 -0.05 (-0.96)
LPG convenience 1.49 1.48 1.49 -0.01 (-0.20)
Distance 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.04 (0.91)
Refill cost 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.01 (0.31)
Fin. restriction 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.05 (1.26)
Food taste 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.02 (0.38)
Safety 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.01 (0.28)
N 539 270 269 539
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A2: Means and tests of treatment-control covariate balance for voucher
owners
Total Control Treatment Difference
mean mean mean b t
Male 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.05 (1.49)
Age 28.31 27.97 28.65 -0.67 (-0.73)
Education 1.52 1.55 1.50 0.05 (0.37)
Household size 5.89 5.75 6.03 -0.29 (-1.22)
Hindu 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.05∗∗∗ (2.60)
Muslim 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.05∗∗ (-2.40)
BPL 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.01 (0.14)
Expenditures 6511.90 6405.41 6619.86 -214.46 (-0.44)
Land 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.01 (0.24)
Asset index -0.09 -0.14 -0.04 -0.10 (-0.65)
Refills 0.91 0.89 0.93 -0.04 (-1.14)
LPG consumption 0.25 0.24 0.26 -0.02 (-1.09)
Wood quantity 46.15 47.54 44.72 2.82 (0.68)
Dung quantity 51.99 49.48 54.56 -5.07 (-1.08)
Random price 305.43 301.51 309.40 -7.89 (-1.51)
Content 0.43 0.42 0.44 -0.02 (-0.61)
Voucher validity 20.61 20.42 20.82 -0.40 (-0.20)
Subsidy 0.17 0.14 0.21 -0.08 (-1.14)
LPG convenience 1.50 1.53 1.47 0.06 (0.66)
Distance 0.47 0.44 0.50 -0.06 (-1.08)
Refill cost 0.88 0.87 0.90 -0.03 (-0.84)
Fin. restriction 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.03 (0.56)
Food taste 0.53 0.56 0.51 0.06 (0.97)
Safety 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.02 (0.43)
WTP for LPG 389.83 382.88 396.91 -14.03∗ (-1.87)
Voucher value 174.64 178.59 170.60 7.99 (1.53)
N 303 153 150 303
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3: Variable definitions and summary statistics
Variable Definition Count Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
WTP Willingness to pay for LPG 539 356.79 71.34 200.0 750.0
Voucher use Dummy = 1 if individual used voucher
before the household-specific expiry date 296 0.35 0.48 0.0 1.0
Key explanatory variable
Health information Dummy = 1 if individual is exposed
to health information 539 0.50 0.50 0.0 1.0
Other variables
Voucher Dummy = 1 if individual received voucher 539 0.56 0.50 0.0 1.0
Voucher validity Days until voucher expiry 538 21.05 18.22 3.5 172.0
Voucher value Voucher value (INR) 303 174.64 45.44 5.0 235.0
Male Dummy = 1 if individual is male 539 0.08 0.27 0.0 1.0
Age Age of the individual 539 28.55 8.18 18.0 65.0
Education Education(Categorical, levels 1-7) 539 1.50 1.16 1.0 7.0
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Household size Number of persons sharing one kitchen 538 6.00 2.31 2.0 20.0
Hindu Dummy =1 if individual is Hindu 539 0.97 0.17 0.0 1.0
Muslim Dummy =1 if individual is Muslim 539 0.03 0.17 0.0 1.0
BPL Dummy = 1 if household holds a BPL card 508 0.60 0.49 0.0 1.0
Expenditures Household consumption expenditures
(INR/month) 521 6752.59 4184.69 400.0 50000.0
Land Dummy = 1 if household owns land 539 0.66 0.48 0.0 1.0
Asset index Weighted index of asset ownership 539 -0.01 1.42 -1.4 6.6
Refills Dummy = 1 if household buys LPG refills 539 0.91 0.29 0.0 1.0
LPG consumption Estimated LPG consumption HH (cylinder/month) 489 0.24 0.15 0.0 1.7
Wood quantity Wood quantity used (kg/week) 536 45.75 37.29 0.0 350.0
Dung quantity Dung quantity used (kg/week) 537 52.47 42.11 0.0 350.0
Content Estimated content currently used cylinder (%) 468 0.45 0.25 0.0 1.0
Subsidy Dummy = 1 if household buys
subsidized cylinders 232 0.15 0.35 0.0 1.0
LPG convenience Convenience LPG vs. trad. cooking
(1-Better, 2-Similar, 3-Worse) 539 1.49 0.74 1.0 4.0
Distance Dummy = 1 if distance explains low LPG usage) 539 0.46 0.50 0.0 1.0
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Refill cost Dummy = 1 if refill costs explain low LPG) 539 0.90 0.30 0.0 1.0
Fin. restriction Refill costs as main hindrance
to regular LPG consumption (respondents share) 539 0.77 0.42 0.0 1.0
Food taste Dummy = 1 if taste of food explains low LPG) 539 0.57 0.50 0.0 1.0
Safety Dummy = 1 if safety explains low LPG) 539 0.24 0.42 0.0 1.0
Severe effects Dummy = 1 if aware of severe effects from IAP 503 0.31 0.46 0.0 1.0
Slight effects Dummy = 1 if aware of slight effects from IAP 503 0.53 0.50 0.0 1.0
No effects Dummy = 1 if not aware of any effects from IAP 503 0.16 0.37 0.0 1.0
IAP diseases Share of six IAP-related diseases
correctly identified (in %) 539 0.34 0.28 0.0 1.0
All diseases Share of ten diseases correctly
identified as either IAP-related or not 539 0.51 0.15 0.1 0.9
Observations 539
Sample restricted to respondents taking part in the WTP Experiment.
IAP = Indoor Air Pollution
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A.4 Information material used for frames
While this appendix contains English versions of the visualizing posters and
texts, the material used in the field was in Hindi language.
A.4.1 Health frame (text for enumerator and poster)
Before we start let me inform you that LPG is very different from firewood
and dung cake regarding the health effects of these fuels. You have certainly
observed that when cooking with the chulha – especially indoors and with
bad ventilation – there is a lot of pollution in the air (show picture of cook-
ing woman). According to studies from different universities and research
institutions, this pollution causes many more health problems than may be
directly observable for the person who cooks and her family. As opposed
to what one may think, the effects are not limited to temporary coughing,
tearing eyes and throat ache, but also include several severe diseases:
1. Generally, many people in India die much earlier than normal from
disease which is caused by air pollution from cooking with solid fuels.
2. A high number of people die for instance prematurely due to a stroke.
It occurs when blood flow to an area of the brain is cut off. Every 4th
case of death from a stroke is due to staying in the polluted air over a
long time.
3. Similarly, indoor air pollution increases the risk for having lung cancer
or a heart disease significantly. It is like smoking a very large amount
of cigarettes every day, you can see on the picture what can happen to
the lung (show pictures lung diseases and heart diseases).
4. It also increases the chances to get a cataract/motyaabind (show picture
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eye diseases). If untreated, cataract/motyaabind can lead to blindness.
5. And it can hinder the development of the children. Women and small
children are the most affected from the pollution. When small children
die from acute lower respiratory infections like pneumonia, this is due
to the indoor air pollution in more than half of the cases (show pic-
ture development of child). Of course, ventilation helps to reduce these
risks. Having an open window and a chimney-hood or cooking out-
side is therefore helpful. But according to available academic studies,
the remaining risks are often considerable and should not be underes-
timated. When cooking on a chulha, the danger to be hit by the above
severe diseases is usually still much stronger than otherwise.
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Figure A2: Visualizing poster health frame
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A.4.2 Alternative frame (text for enumerator and poster)
Before we start, let me give you some information about how liquefied petroleum
gas or LPG, your cooking gas, is produced. LPG is a fossil fuel. Sometimes
it is recovered naturally, directly from the ground. Another way of producing
LPG is by refining it from crude oil. Crude oil is a thick and black liquid.
It is a mixture of different chemicals which can be used as fuel because they
burn well. Most crude oil is found by drilling down through rocks on land or
off-shore on the bottom of the ocean.
• Look, we have a picture of an oil field off the coast of Mumbai. The oil
gets pumped up from a deep hole in the ocean floor (show picture of
oil field off the coast of Mumbai).
• Crude oil cannot be used as a fuel as it is. Therefore, the crude oil
must be transported to a so-called oil refinery as a first step. This can
best be done through a crude oil pipeline, which pumps the crude oil
from the oil field to a refinery (show picture of crude oil pipe). This
pipeline transports crude oil from the Barmer district, Rajasthan to
Salaya, Gujarat.
• At the oil refinery, the crude oil is heated and then distilled to sepa-
rate it into different petroleum products (show picture of oil refinery).
These include gasoline for cars, ship fuel and the petroleum gas used
for cooking.
• But gas takes up a lot of space. To make storage easier, the gas is
liquefied by compressing with high pressure. This is why your cooking
gas is called liquefied petroleum gas or LPG.
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• Then the liquefied gas is transported to a bottling plant. There it gets
filled into the cylinders that you know (show picture of bottling plan).
They are small enough for a relatively easy transport. Since the gas is
still liquid, it does not take up too much room.
• As a last step, LPG distributors deliver the LPG cylinders to customers
in local markets (show picture of delivery).
• In some major cities, households do not have to buy the LPG bottled up
in cylinders, but instead receive gas through a pipeline in their kitchen
(show picture of woman with stove and gas pipeline).
• If you release the liquid from the cylinder by turning on your appliance,
it turns back into gas.
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Figure A3: Visualizing poster alternative frame
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A.5 Offer Prices
A.5.1 Offer Prices in the WTP eliciting mechanism
Enumerators determine the offer prices pd used in the WTP eliciting mecha-
nism by drawing a random piece from a set of price-cards covering the range
from 245 to 475 INR in steps of 5 INR.
The choice of the price range is based on the following reflection: Even if
a household’s currently used cylinder was full at the time of the survey and
even if its demand for LPG was completely inelastic (i.e., it does not speed-
up consumption due to price-reductions), it would be left with a maximum
of 50% of the cylinder content (market value = 240 INR) at the expiry date
of the voucher, i.e., when the cylinder is to be replaced by a full one. All
households should thus accept to replace their currently used cylinder by a
full one if they are given a compensation C = 480 − 240 = 240 INR, and a
higher discount should not be necessary in our context.
Figure A4 shows the empirical distribution of the prices. While prices
were drawn from the full range of possible values, their distribution is right
skewed. Offer prices below the mean (339) are more frequent than prices
that are higher than this average. This is surprising as an approximately
uniform distribution of offer prices should have been expected. A chi-square
test comparing the observed frequencies to the expected frequencies under
a discrete uniform distribution clearly rejects the null-hypothesis that these
distributions are equal (p=0.000).
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Figure A4: Distribution of offer prices
Histogram with heights of the bars representing observed frequencies of offer-prices
and density curve as approximation of the proportion of values in certain price-
ranges.
This raises some doubts regarding the random selection. It cannot be
excluded for instance that, in some cases, enumerators made the selection
only among higher discount values in order to provide extra benefits to the
household. However, since WTP is measured before offer prices are drawn,
this should not affect our main results.
A.5.2 Offer Prices and voucher use probability
This section examines the effect of the randomly determined offer price in
more detail. Table A4 shows the results of a linear probability model es-
timation that includes the voucher value, i.e., the offered price discount D
(= pm − pd) as a continuous variable.
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Table A4: Joint effect of health information on voucher use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health info 0.058∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.094∗ 0.115∗
(0.094) (0.023) (0.061) (0.056)
Discount (per 20 INR) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Discount X Health info -0.003 -0.003
(0.764) (0.787)
Male 0.161∗
(0.064)
Content -0.081
(0.369)
Voucher validity -0.001
(0.587)
Asset index 0.014
(0.266)
Land 0.027
(0.477)
LPG distance 0.003∗
(0.072)
Fin. restriction 0.036
(0.402)
Education 0.008
(0.683)
Age -0.002
(0.305)
Household size -0.015∗∗
(0.024)
Months since LPG adoption 0.003
(0.313)
Constant 0.169∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.053
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.622)
adj. R2 0.003 0.094 0.092 0.104
N 532 531 531 449
Linear probability models, p-values based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Column 1 reports the point estimate for the uncontrolled comparison between
treatment and control group as a baseline (see also Table 4 in Section 5.2.2).
Column 2 shows that the treatment effect is hardly affected by the additional
inclusion of the offer price.
As compared to Column 1, the estimate in Column 2 slightly increases
from 6 to 7 percentage points and becomes more precise, just as in Table 4
when we include offer-price fixed effects. It further increases to 11 percentage
points when we add more controls.
The discount itself has a very robust effect of 4 percentage points per
20 INR price reduction (i.e., 10 percentage points per 50 INR). In Columns (3)
and (4) we test whether the price reduction interacts with the treatment ef-
fect. This does not seem to be the case.
Using the regression in Column 4, Figure A5 illustrates how the predicted
probability of voucher use increases with rising discounts (depicted in steps of
20 INR). Corresponding to the insignificant interaction term in Table A4, the
lines for the treatment and the control group are about equidistant across the
range of discount values. Differences are significant for intermediate voucher
values between 45 and 145 INR.
75
Figure A5: Predicted Probability of voucher use
Linear probability model as estimated in column 4 of Table A4 and 90% CI’s
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